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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EV ALINE HARMON and 
(\)XRAD HARMON, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
OTTO RASMUSSEN, LeREE RAS-
MlTNSEN, his wife; LEONARD M. 
SPROUL, and AMERICAN FALLS 
CANAL SECURITIES COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
9690 
Brief of Defendants - Respond·ents 
STATE:J1:ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiffs seek judgment subjecting defendant's land 
to an irrigation ditch easement over and across it claim-
ing 60 years user, and $400 in damages as cost of recon-
~tructing the ditch. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment 
for the defendants plaintiffs appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest at one time held 
title to both tracts of land here involved, and at sometime 
conveyed to defendant's predecessor in interest the 
parcel which plaintiffs seek to make servient to their 
land. 
The main ditch used by the plaintiffs flows generally 
west across and to the west side of 11th West Street 
which is also the east, or front, boundary of a number of 
house plots, one of which is defendant's. At a point ap-
proximately 50 feet south of the southeast corner of 
defendant's lot, the ditch forks. From the fork its princi-
pal course is generally southwesterly until it reaches the 
land of the plaintiffs which lies along the west or rear 
boundary of the house plots referred to herein. (Ex D5) 
From the fork the side ditch went north along the 
front or east boundary of defendant's land to its north-
east corner, and then coursed west about 335 feet to the 
northeast corner of plaintiffs' land. 
The water was diverted into this side ditch, which 
is the contentious subject of this lawsuit, at least twice 
per year, but not at all after culinary water was brought 
along 11th West Street, (R41 LNS3-28), which was done 
in about the year 1954 (R64 LNS26-:29) by defendant's 
testimony. 
The ditch area to the south of the diversion gate in 
the side ditch was filled in by the plaintiffs prior to 
July 1958 to the level indicated in Exhibit D3 (R45 
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LXRS-30; R-HJ LNS1018; R70-72 LNS25-2) employing a 
tractor for the purpose. (R61 LNS1-12) 
The side ditch as it fronts the Rasmussen property 
was filled in before April 4, 1960 (R26 LNS2-20). The 
Rasmussen house was moved onto the Rasmussen lot over 
this fill in the ditch in July 1960 (R77 LNS11-21; R76 
LNS2-20) 
The fill in this ditch in front of Rasmussen property 
was deposited by government workers clearing Mill 
Creek and changing the course of the Jordan River about 
March 1960. (Rl06 LNS2-18) 
The Rasmussens bought (by uniform real estate 
contract) this lot Th:fay 23, 1960. (R90 LNS7-17 - Ex 
D4) At the time of purchase, sections of the side ditch 
were either levelled or had piles of dirt in it 12 to 15 feet 
long and 4 feet above the surface of the ground (R71-72 
LNS21-2) which Rasmussen levelled out. (R92 LNS14-19; 
Rl16-117 LNS28-22) 
The 1nean level of the west side of 11th West Street 
is from 6 to 10 feet higher than the east boundary of 
appellants' land which lies approximately 300 feet to the 
west. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, OR IN 
ANY EVENT REVERSIBLE ERROR, IN FAILING TO DE-
CIDE ALL OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS 
IF THE DECISION OF THE COURT EXPRESSLY OR IM-
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PLIEDLY DETERMINED SUFFJtCIENT MATERIAL ISSUES 
UPON WHICH TO BASE JUDGMENT. 
While it is incumbent on the court to make findings 
on all material issues, it is not reversible error where the 
failure to make such findings is not prejudicial. Hall v. 
Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P 1110; Baker v. Hatch, 70 Utah 
1, 257 P 673; Prows v. Hawley, 72 Utah 4±4, 271 P 529; 
West v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 P(2d) 292; 
Huber et al v. Newman 106, Utah 363; 145 P(2d) 780; 
Gaddis lnv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah (2d) 43, 277 P(2d) 
805; Dtmcan v. Hernmelwright, 112 rtah 262, 186 P(2d) 
965. 
Hall v. Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P 1110 declares: 
"It has been determined by numerous deci-
sions of this court that the failure to make find-
ings upon immaterial issues, or issues which would 
not affect the judgment of the court, is not ground 
for reversal." 
Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262; 186 P(2d) 
965 at Pg. 269 declares : 
"Failure to make findings on material issues 
is not prejudicial, if no findings, other than in 
support of the judgment would have been permis-
sible.'' 
"And, of course, failure to n1ake findings on 
immaterial issues, or issues which would not af-
fect the judgment of the court is not ground for 
reversal." 
"And findings should be limited to the ulti-
mate facts. It is not necessary to make findings 
on the subsidiary or evidentiary facts." 
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Iiul>er et al v. Newman, 106 Utah 363; 145 P(2d) 
780 declares : 
'• Even though failure of the trial court to 
make a negative finding that ... were error, it 
would not be prejudicial error requiring reversal 
since had such findings been made the judgment 
would have been the same in any case." 
Nor is it reversible error when findings may be im-
plied from those expressly set forth. S.imper v. Brown, 
7+ Utah 178, 186 P 529, citing lJfitchell v. Jensen, 29 Utah 
;{~-(i, 81 P 165; Dillon Imp. Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah 1, 
RR P 670; Ererett v. Jones, 32 Utah 489, 91 P 360. 
FHm,per v. Brown, 74 Utah 178, 186 P 529 declares: 
"The rule is well settled in this as in other 
jurisdictions, that findings must respond to and 
cover all of the material issues raised by the 
pleadings, whether evidence respecting this was 
or was not adduced; and, if there be no such ex-
pressed or implied findings the judgment has no 
support.'' 
The issues for which appellants contend findings 
are: 1) That plaintiffs are owners of the land described 
in Paragraph 2 of their Second Amended Complaint. 2) 
That plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest for 
more than 60 years have openly, notoriously, adversely, 
and continuously under claim of right used an irrigation 
ditch acros:;; defendant's land. 
If this first issue was found against appellants, they 
would be out of court. If the issue was expressly found 
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PLIEDLY DETERMINED SUFFICIENT MATERIAL ISSUES 
UPON WHICH TO BASE JUDGMENT. 
\Yhile it is incumbent on the court to make finrlings 
on all material issues, it is not reversible error 'vhPrP the 
failure to make such findings is not prejudicial. lloll r. 
Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P 1110; Baker v. l/atclt, 70 Utah 
1, 257 P 673; Prows v. Hawley, 7:21Ttah 4:-l-..t-, :271 P ;):2!); 
West v. Standard F1tel Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 P(2d) 292; 
H1tber et al v. Newman 106, Utah 363; 145 P(2d) 780; 
Gaddis Inv. Co. v. lJforrison, 3 Utah (2d) 43, 277 P(2d) 
805; D11ncan v. Hemmelu:riqht, 11:2 l'tah :2():2, 1Sii P(:2d) 
965. 
Hall v. Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P 1110 declares: 
"It has been determined h)T numerous deci-
sions of this court that the failure to make find-
ings upon immaterial issues, or issues which would 
not affect the judgment of the court, is not ground 
for reversal." 
Duncan v. llemmelwright, 112 Utah 262; 186 P(2d) 
965 at Pg. 269 declares : 
"Failure to make findings on material issues 
is not prejudicial, if no findings, other than in 
support of the judgment would have been permis-
sible.'' 
"And, of course, failure to make findings on 
immaterial issues, or issues which would not af-
fect the judgment of the court is not ground for 
reversal." 
"And findings should be limited to the ulti-
mate facts. It is not necessary to make findings 
on the subsidiary or evidentiary facts." 
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I-IulJer et al v. Newman, 106 Utah 363; 145 P(2d) 
780 declares : 
"Even though failure of the trial court to 
make a negative finding that ... were error, it 
would not be prejudicial error requiring reversal 
since had such findings been made the judgment 
would have been the same in any case." 
Nor is it reversible error when findings may be im-
plied from those expressly set forth. Simper v. Brown, 
7-t Utah 178, 186 P 529, citing llfitchell v. Jensen, 29 Utah 
346, 81 P 165; Dillon Imp. Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah 1, 
88 P 670; Everett v. Jones, 32 Utah 489, 91 P 360. 
S1"rnper v. Brown, 7 4 Utah 178, 186 P 529 declares: 
"The rule is well settled in this as in other 
jurisdictions, that findings must respond to and 
cover all of the material issues raised by the 
pleadings, whether evidence respecting this was 
or was not adduced; and, if there be no such ex-
pressed or implied findings the judgment has no 
support.'' 
The issues for which appellants contend findings 
are: 1) That plaintiffs are owners of the land described 
in Paragraph 2 of their Second Amended Complaint. 2) 
That plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest for 
more than 60 years have openly, notoriously, adversely, 
and continuously under claim of right used an irrigation 
ditch across defendant's land. 
If this first issue was found against appellants, they 
would be out of court. If the issue was expressly found 
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for the1n, it would have no bearing on the outronw of thP 
lawsuit: and, therefore, is not material. In fad, the i~~HP 
was conceded by stipulation at the very outset of the 
trial. 
If the second issue could expressly be found in favor 
of the appellants, even then it would not be determinative 
of the ultimate issue of the lawsuit. If the issue was 
found against the appellants, they would he out of court. 
However, appellants have established no adverse 
user for the minimum prescriptive period of 20. years 
despite the fact that the burden of proof is upon them so 
to do. There is no evidence in the record that there has 
been a severance of the servient estate from the dominant 
for that required period of time. Appellant's contention 
of sixty years user is not alone a test for the reason, in-
controvertibly established in the law, that in the hanc\3 
of one owner the use of one part of his property for the 
benefit of another part is an exercise of property right. 
While in the trial court's finding of abandonment is the 
implication that there had been an easement of user, it 
is possible that the Court had evaded a specific finding 
on this issue because the evidence had not completely 
satisfied it that there had been such adverse user, but 
found itself on firmer ground for its decision in its find-
ing of abandonment. 
The ultimate issue of this lawsuit was determined in 
the one express finding of the court to the effect of 
abandonment on the part of the appellants. In this find-
ing it additionally implied ownership of the lands in-
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volved in appellants and respondents as appellants allege. 
Respondent, therefore, submits that the findings are ade-
quate either expressly or by implication to satisfy the 
rules of court and to support the judgment. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
EXHIBIT D3 IN EVIDENCE. 
Comparison with the reclining figure of the man and 
the application of judicial notice to the average height of 
man indicates the extent of the ditch fill in at one point. 
Testimony of the defendant's witness that part of this 
fill was made by him employing a tractor for the pur-
pose, and that the total amount of the fill indicated was 
in place in 1957 establishes a time element as well. It is, 
therefore, pertinent, material, and relevant to show that 
the state of the ditch for the period from 1957 to and 
through the time of the trial, including the time when 
respondent examined as the prospective purchaser. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN DID NOT FILL IN THE DITCH. 
Appellant's reliance on doctrine of ratification to 
establish Rasmussen complicity is inapplicable under 
testimony in subject case in that no testimony establishes 
any relationship between Rasmussen and prior-acting 
individuals. 
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"'\Yith respect to the doctrine of ratification upon 
which appellants insist, perusal of Jo11es 'l'. J/ u I ual 
Creamery Compauy, 81 Ptah ~~3. 17 P(:2d) :2-1-D, ~;) ALR 
908, discussing the 1natter of ratification estahli~hP~ the 
need for an identity of interest and some pr<>l:'ent <>X i~t ing 
relationship at the time of the arts for "·hich ratifier iH 
to he held responsible. Nowhere in the record does it indi-
cate respondents to be in any way related with the persons 
responsible for filling the ditch; namely, the appellantH, 
the United States Corps of Engineers, or other parties 
unknown. 
On page 231 of the .Jones case, 2 C.J. 467, i~ stated 
with approval as follows: 
"ratification as it relates to the law of agency 
may be defined as the express or implied adoption 
and confirmation by one person of an act or con-
tract performed or entered into in his behalf by 
another who at the time assumed to act as his 
agent in doing the act or making the contract, 
without authority to do so. The substance of a 
ratification is confinnation after conduct; it con-
firms; it neither changes the contract nor makes 
a new one with different terms." 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT JUSTIFIABLY FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFFS HAD ABANDONED THE SIDE DITCH. 
Conrad Hannon, one of the plaintiffs, testified that 
the side ditch had not been used since the yPar culinary 
water had been brought along 11th vVest Street. His nep-
hew, Dean Hannon, testified for plaintiffs stating that 
~ 
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culinary water was brought along 11th \Vest Street in 
1~l:l-1- or 1955. Defendant's witness, Nick Coons, testified 
that he has not seen the so-called side ditch used in the 
6 years that he has lived neighbor to the defendant Ras-
mussen's property. Ruth Beynon, witness for the defen-
dant, testified that she had not seen the side ditch used 
in the 11 years she has lived neighbor to the defendant 
Rasmussen's property. Dean Harmon further testified 
that he had used a tractor to fill an area of the ditch 
indicated by Exhibit D3 prior to 1958. Testimony further 
indicates that the west side of 11th West Street is sub-
stantially higher than the east edge of the Harmon 
property which lies some 325 feet to the west which 
indicates that there is sufficient flow and sufficient drop 
to carry water to any part of the Harmon properties 
should they desire to do so by ditching from the point 
where the main ditch enters the llarmon property. 
All the facts together with the court's taking judicial 
notice of the critical need for irrigation waters in this 
area lead only to one conclusion. The intent of the Har-
mons, coupled with the acts in filling the ditch and the 
nonuser for any of the periods herein mentioned consti-
tutes abandonment. (R107 LNS2-30; R117 LNS23-28) 
17 A Am J ur 775-6 exhaustively discusses the subject 
of abandonment in Section 170 as follows: 
"An easement created by grant or deed may be 
extinguished by abandonment. It may be aban-
doned in whole or in part and either by unequivo-
cal acts showing a clear intention to abandon and 
terminate the right or by acts in pais without deed 
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or other writing. The acts claimed to constitntP 
the abandon1nent mn:-;t slHn\· a destruction of the 
easement, impossibility of its legitimate nsr re-
sulting from smne act of the ens<>ment owner, or 
other unequivocal conduct revealing tlH' intention 
permanently to abandon and surrender the easP-
nlent. The question of abandonment of an ease-
ment ordinarily is one of fact for the jury. 
''The intention to abandon is the material question 
and may be proved by an infinite variety of arts. 
It is a question of fact to be ascertained from all 
the circumstances of the casP, and the moment the 
intention to abandon and the relinquislunent of 
possession unite, the abandonment is complete ... 
"Time is not an essential element of abandonment, 
and is not necessarily an important consideration 
in determining whether an easement has been 
lost by abandonment. A cessation of use for a 
term less than the prescriptive period, accom-
panied by acts clearly indicating an intent to 
abandon the easement, will effect its extinguish-
ment." 
Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 Utah 257, 102 P 
740, 24 LRA NS 86; Dahnken v. Romney, 111 Utah 471; 
184 P(2d) 211; Tuttle v. Sowadski, 41 Ftah 501; 126 P 
959; People v. Ocean Shore R. Co., 32 Cal(2d) 406, 196 
P(2d) 570, 6 ALR(2d) 1179; Powers 'V. Coos Bay Lumbf'r 
Co., 200 Ore 329, 263 P(2d) 913. 
Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 Ftah 257, 
102 P 7 40, 24 LRA NS 86 declares : 
"The mere nonuser of an easement created by 
deed, however long continued, is not of itself an 
abandonment of it, but, at most, in connection with 
other facts, may be evidence of intention to aban-
10 
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don or of actual abandonment, but an easement 
may nevertheless be lost or extinguished. The 
law with regard to this subject is stated in 14 
CYC 1192 in the following words: 
"An easement may be extinguished by an act 
of the owner of the easement which is incompatible 
with the existence of the right claimed. If the 
owner himself observes it in a manner inconsistent 
with its further enjoyment, or permits the owner 
of the servient estate to do so, the easement will 
be considered abandoned." 
T1Jttle v. Sowadski, 41 Utah 501; 126 P959 declares: 
''That an easement may be abandoned is well 
settled . . . It may, however, be abandoned, and 
thus extinguished, and this may be found to have 
taken place when the acts of the owner thereof 
clearly show that such was his purpose. When an 
easement is once abandoned, it is extinguished for 
all time." 
Powers v. Coos Bay Lumber Co., 200 Ore 329, 263 
P(2d) 913 at 943 quotes Bitney v. Grim, 73 Ore 257, 144 
P 490 as follows: 
"Time is not an essential element of abandon-
ment. The moment the intention to abandon and 
the relinquishment of possession unite, the aban-
donment is complete." 
POINT V. 
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN IS A PURCHASER IN 
GOOD FAITH WITH A RIGHT TO RELY ON THE AP-
PARENT ASPECTS OF THE PROPERTY HE PURCHASED. 
11 
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There was obviously no ditch to put him on not i<'<' of 
a possible ditch easement OY<.'r and a<"ro~:..; hiH land. 
Neither was there any public record of the <.>x i~t<'ncr of 
this easement. 
17 A Am Jur 761-2 in Section 156 discusses noti<'P of 
an easement or apparent easements from the physieal 
condition of property as follow8: 
"It has often been said that in order to aff<'rt the 
purchaser of a servient <'~tnt<.> the pa~PlliPnt if 
unrecorded, must be one that i~ apparent as \\'PII 
as necessary and continuous, or the marks of thr 
servitude must be open and visible. Accordingly, 
it is held that if the servitude cannot be discovered 
by an inspection of the premises, the purchaser is 
not charged with notice of its existence except in 
so far as he may be charged with constructive 
notice under the recording laws. On the other 
hand, the proposition that a purchaser of real 
estate is charged with notice of an easement where 
the existence of the servitude is apparent upon 
an ordinary inspection of the premises is sound 
beyond question. Normally, since an easement 
implied, upon the severance of a tract, from an 
existing use is a physically obvious servitude, a 
purchaser of the servient estate will be charged 
with notice of the easement. 
"In this connection, the fact that an easement is 
an 'apparent easement' is of importance in 
charging a purchaser of the servient estate with 
notice of such easement, and' apparent easements' 
have been defined in this resp<>ct as those which 
may be discovered upon reasonable inspection. In 
regard to charging with notice the transferee of 
the servient estate, apparent easements are not 
12 
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only such as are visible or must necessarily be 
seen, but such as may be seen or known on a care-
ful inspection by a person ordinarily conversant 
with the subject. Examples of apparent easements 
include canals and ditches, ... and water rights." 
Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Urschell, 159 Kan 674, 
157 P(2d) 805; Blake v. Boye, 38 Colo 55, 88 P 470, 8 
LRA NS 418; JJJ ontesa v. Gelmstedt, 70 N ev 418, 270 P 
(2d) 668. 
Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Urschell, 159 Kan 
67-t-, 157 P(2d) 805 was an action to restrain defendant 
from barring plaintiff's use of a staircase on defendant's 
property and connected with plaintiff's building by a 
door through the wall between the buildings. 
Plaintiff was denied the relief. The court in its syl-
labus declaring: 
''One who has acquired a right or interest in 
real estate under an unrecorded contract may 
assert and maintain his right and interest there 
even as against one who has subsequently pur-
chased that real estate from the record owner if 
such subsequent purchaser had actual or implied 
notice of the right and interest possessed by the 
holder of the unrecorded instrument. 
"Notice is implied when it consists of know-
ledge of facts so informing that a reasonably 
cautious person would be prompted to inquire 
further ... " 
Blake v. Boyle, 38 Colo 55, 88 P 470, 8 LRA NS 418 
involved a ditch across the land of a bona fide purchaser. 
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The court declared at Pg. 471: 
"There being no evidence of the existence of 
a ditch across the land at the time the defendants 
acquired their title thereto, the defendants being 
without notice of the existence of a right of way 
across the land, this being an action to quiet title, 
we are of the opinion that plaintiffs failed ... " 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant-respondent is justifiably entitled to have 
the decision and judgment of the trial court affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BERNARD L. ROSE 
Attorney for Respondent 
53 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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